In this paper, we consider a risk-averse decision problem for controlled-diffusion processes, with dynamic risk measures, in which there are two risk-averse decision makers (i.e., leader and follower) with different risk-averse related responsibilities and information. Moreover, we assume that there are two objectives that these decision makers are expected to achieve. That is, the first objective being of stochastic controllability type that describes an acceptable risk-exposure set vis-á-vis some uncertain future payoff, and while the second one is making sure the solution of a certain risk-related system equation has to stay always above a given continuous stochastic process, namely obstacle. In particular, we introduce multi-structure, time-consistent, dynamic risk measures induced from conditional g-expectations, where the latter are associated with the generator functionals of two backward-SDEs that implicitly take into account the above two objectives along with the given continuous obstacle process. Moreover, under certain conditions, we establish the existence of optimal hierarchical risk-averse solutions, in the sense of viscosity solutions, to the associated risk-averse dynamic programming equations that formalize the way in which both the leader and follower consistently choose their respective risk-averse decisions. Finally, we remark on the implication of our result in assessing the influence of the leader's decisions on the risk-averseness of the follower in relation to the direction of leader-follower information flow.
Introduction
Let Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P be a probability space, and let {B t } t≥0 be a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion, whose natural filtration, augmented by all P-null sets, is denoted by {F t } t≥0 , so that it satisfies the usual hypotheses (e.g., see [22] or [12] ). We consider the following controlled-diffusion process over a given finite-time horizon T > 0 dX u,v t = m t, X u,v t , (u t , v t ) dt + σ t, X u,v t , (u t , v t ) dB t , X u,v 0
where
-(u · , v · ) is a pair of (U × V )-valued measurable decision processes such that for all t > s, (B t − B s ) is independent of (u r , v r ) for r ≤ s (nonanticipativity condition) and Notation: Let us introduce the following spaces that will be useful later in the paper.
-L 2 Ω, F t , P; R d is the set of R d -valued F t -measurable random variables ξ such that
-L ∞ Ω, F t , P is the set of R-valued F t -measurable random variables ξ such that ξ = ess inf ξ < ∞; -S 2 t, T ; R d is the set of R d -valued adapted processes ϕ s t≤s≤T on Ω × [t, T ] such that ϕ
[t,T ]
= E sup t≤s≤T ϕ s 2 < ∞;
-H 2 t, T ; R d is the set of R d -valued progressively measurable processes ϕ s t≤s≤T such that ϕ
= E T t ϕ s 2 ds < ∞.
In this paper, we consider a risk-averse decision problem for the above controlled-diffusion process, in which there are two hierarchical decision makers (i.e., leader and follower with differing risk-averse related responsibilities and information) choose their decisions from progressively measurable strategy sets. That is, the leader's decision u · is a U -valued measurable control process from
and while the follower's decision v · is a V -valued measurable control process from
Furthermore, we consider the following two cost functionals that provide information about the accumulated risk-costs on the time interval [0, T ] w.r.t. the leader and follower, i.e.,
leader's risk-cost:
and follower's risk-cost: Moreover, we also assume that f , σ, c l , c f , Ψ l and Ψ f , for p ≥ 1, satisfy the following growth conditions m t, x, (u, v)) + σ t, x, (u, v) + c l t, x, u + Ψ l x
and m t, x, (u, v)) + σ t, x, (u, v) + c f t, x, v + Ψ f x
On the same probability space Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P , we consider the following backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) where the terminal value Y T = ξ belongs to L 2 Ω, F T , P; R and the generator func-
with property that g t, y, z 0≤t≤T is progressively measurable for each (y, z) ∈ R × R d . We also assume that g satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 1
(1.1) g is Lipschitz in (y, z), i.e., there exists a constant K > 0 such that, P-a.s., for any
(1.3) P-a.s., for all t ∈ [0, T ] and y ∈ R, g t, y, 0 = 0.
Then, we state the following lemma, which is used to establish the existence of a unique adapted solution (e.g., see [17] for additional discussions).
Lemma 2
Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, for any ξ ∈ L 2 Ω, F T , P; R , the BSDE in (8) , with terminal condition Y T = ξ, i.e.,
has a unique adapted solution
Moreover, we recall the following comparison result that will be useful later (e.g., see [18] 
In the following, we give the definition for a dynamic risk measure that is associated with the generator of BSDE in (8) .
Then, we define the dynamic risk measure ρ
2 Here, we remark that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], the conditional g-expectation (denoted by Eg ξ|Ft ) is also defined by
Remark 1 Note that such a risk measure is widely used for evaluating the risk of uncertain future outcomes, and also assisting with stipulating minimum interventions required by financial institutions for risk management (e.g., see [2] , [21] , [8] , [11] , [6] or [4] for related discussions). In Section 2, we use multi-structure, time-consistent, dynamic risk measures induced from conditional g-expectations, where the latter are associated with the generator functionals of two backward-SDEs that implicitly take into account the cost functionals of the leader and follower along with the given continuous obstacle process; and we provide a hierarchical framework for the risk-averse decision problem for the controlled-diffusion process.
Moreover, if the generator functional g satisfies Assumption 1, then a family of time-consistent dynamic risk measures ρ
has the following properties (see [21] for additional discussions).
Remark 2 Note that, since the seminal work of Artzner et al. [2] , there have been studies on axiomatic dynamic risk measures, coherency and consistency in the literature (e.g., see [6] , [21] , [24] , [11] or [4] ). Particularly relevant for us are, time-consistent, dynamic risk measures, induced from conditional g-expectations associated with generator functionals of BSDEs satisfying the above properties (p1)-(p5).
Here it is worth mentioning that some interesting studies on the dynamic risk measures, based on the conditional g-expecations, have been reported in the literature (e,g. see [21] , [4] and [24] for establishing connection between the risk measures and the generator of BSDE; and see also [26] for characterizing the generator of BSDE according to different risk measures). Recently, the authors in [25] and [3] have provided interesting results on the risk-averse decision problem for Markov decision processes, in discrete-time setting, and, respectively, a hierarchical risk-averse framework for controlled-diffusion processes. Note that the rationale behind our framework follows in some sense the settings of these papers. However, to our knowledge, the problem of dynamic consistent risk-aversion for controlleddiffusion processes has not been addressed in the context of hierarchical argument, and it is important because it provides a mathematical framework that shows how a such framework can be systematically used to obtain optimal risk-averse decisions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, using the basic remarks made in Section 1, we state the hierarchical risk-averse decision problem for the controlleddiffusion process. In Section 3, we present our main results -where we introduce a framework under which the follower is required to respond optimally to the risk-averse decision of the leader so as to achieve an overall consistent risk-averseness. Moreover, we establish the existence of optimal risk-averse solutions, in the sense of viscosity solutions, to the associated risk-averse dynamic programming equations. Finally, Section 4 provides further remarks.
The hierarchical risk-averse decision problem formulation
In order to make our hierarchical formulation more precise, we further assume following. 
Then, for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R d , we consider the following forward-SDE with an initial condition X t,x;w t = x dX t,x;w s (14) where w · (u · , v · ) is a pair of (U, V )-valued measurable decision processes. Furthermore, we also suppose that the data (ξ T arget , L) take the following forms
Moreover, we introduce the following two risk-value functions w.r.t. the leader and follower, i.e.,
and similarly
Taking into account Assumption 3 (and with Markovian risk-averse decisions), we can express the above two risk-value functions using reflected-and standard-BSDE as follows
where A t,x;w s is increasing and continuous, and 
Noting the conditions in (6) and (7) 
Remark 3 Here, it is worth remarking that, for a given continuous progressively real-valued process L t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T satisfying (13) and for each (t, (20) . Then, this is equivalent to solve Ȳ t,x;w ,Z t,x;w = Ŷ t,x;w + A t,x;w ,Ẑ t,x;w ∈ S 2 t, T ; R × H 2 t, T ; R In what follows, we introduce a hierarchical framework that requires a certain level of riskaverseness be achieved for the leader as a priority over that of the follower. For example, suppose that the risk-averse decision for the leaderû · ∈ U [t,T ] is given. Then, the problem of finding an optimal risk-averse decision for the follower, i.e.,v · ∈ V [t,T ] , which minimizes the accumulated risk-cost under v is then reduced to finding an optimal risk-averse solution for
Note that, for a givenû · ∈ U [t,T ] , if the forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) in (14), (21) and the reflected-BSDE in (20) admit unique solutions, then we havê
for some measurable mapping
. Moreover, if we substitutê w = (û, F (û)) into (14) , then the corresponding solution X t,x;ŵ s depends uniformly onû · for s ∈ [t, T ]. Further, the risk-averse decision problem (which minimizes the accumulated risk-cost under u w.r..t the leader) is then reduced to finding an optimal risk-averse solution for
Remark 4 Note that the generator functionals g l and g f contain a common term g that acts on different processes (see also equation (20) and (21)). Moreover, due to differing cost functionals w.r.t. the leader and follower, ρ
T · ] provide multi-structure dynamic risk measures.
Next, we introduce the definition of admissible hierarchical risk-averse decision system Σ [t,T ] , with time-consistent, dynamic risk measures, which provides a logical construct for our main results (e.g., see also [15] ).
Definition 2 For a given finite-time horizon T > 0, we call Σ [t,T ] an admissible hierarchical risk-averse decision system, if it satisfies the following conditions:
-Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P is a complete probability space;
, where F t s = σ B s ; t ≤ s ≤ T is augmented by all P-null sets in F ;
-There exists at least one measurable mapping F : (14), (21) and the reflected-BSDE in (20) admit a unique solution set X
Then, with restriction to the above admissible hierarchical risk-averse decision system, we can state the risk-averse decision problem as follow.
Problem (P). Find a pair of risk-averse strategies
and
where F is a measurable mapping the set
and, furthermore, the accumulated risk-costs J l and J f over the time-interval [0, T ] are given
where X 0,x;w 0 = x and w · = (u · , v · ).
3
In the following section, we establish the existence of optimal risk-averse solutions, in the sense of viscosity, for the risk-averse optimization problems in (27) and (28) with restriction to Σ [0,T ] . Note that, for a given u · ∈ U [0,T ] , the risk-averse optimization problem in (28) has a unique solution on V [0,T ] . Moreover, as we will see later on, the problem in (27) makes sense if the follower is involved not only in minimizing his own accumulated riskcost (in response to the risk-averse decision of the leader) but also in minimizing that of the leader.
Main results
In this section, we present our main results, where we introduce a hierarchical framework under which the follower is required to respond optimally to the risk-averse decision of the leader so as to achieve an overall risk-averseness. Moreover, such a framework allows us to establish the existence of optimal risk-averse solutions, in the sense of viscosity solutions, to the associated risk-averse dynamic programming equations.
We now state the following propositions that will be useful for proving our main results in Subsections 3.1 and 3.3.
Proposition 1
Suppose that the generator functional g satisfies Assumption 1. Further, let the statements in (6), (7) and Assumption 3 along with (15) hold true. Then, for any
, the FBSDEs in (14) , (21) and the reflected-BSDE in (20) admit unique adapted solutions 
where 
Then, the forward of the reflected BSDE in (20) and that of the BSDE in (21) ) , P-a.s.
Proof For any r ∈ [t, T ], with t ∈ [0, T ], we consider the following probability space Ω, F , P ·|F t r , {F t } and notice that η is deterministic under this probability space. Then, for any s ≥ r, there exist progressively measurable processes ψ 1 and ψ 2 such that
whereB s = B s − B r is a standard d-dimensional brownian motion. Note that the pairs u · , v · are F t r -adapted processes, then we have the following restriction w.r.t.
where ω ′ ∈ Ω ′ such that Ω ′ ∈ F , with P(Ω ′ ) = 1. Furthermore, noting Lemma 2, if we work under the probability space Ω ′ , F , P ·|F In what follows, we restrict our discussion w.r.t. the generator functional g f which is associated with the follower. Moreover, for w = (u, v) ∈ U × V and any φ(x) ∈ C ∞ 0 (R d ), we introduce a family of second-order linear operators, associated with (1), as follow
where a(t, x, w) = σ(t, x, w)σ T (t, x, w), D x and D 
we consider the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) partial differential equation (PDE)
where u is assumed to be given
with the following boundary condition
Remark 5 Here, we remark that the above equation in (40) together with (41), is associated with the risk-averse decision problem for the follower, restricted to Σ [t,T ] (cf. Definition 2), with cost functional in (30). Moreover, it represents a generalized HJB equation with additional terms g f . Note that the problem of FBSDEs and reflected BSDEs (cf. equations (14), (20) and (21)) and the solvability of the related HJB partial differential equations (PDEs) have been well studied in literature (e.g., see [1] , [9] , [13] , [15] , [16] , [18] , [19] and [20] ).
Next, we recall the definition of viscosity solutions for (40) together with (41) (e.g., see [5] , [10] or [14] for additional discussions on the notion of viscosity solutions). 
and for
e., a local maximum at (t 0 , x 0 )), then we have
e., a local minimum at (t 0 , x 0 )), then we have 
Further, if we applying the properties of time-consistency and translation to Vṽ f t, x , then we have 
Since ǫ is arbitrary, we obtain (46). On the other hand, to show the reverse inequality " ≤ ", letṽ · (which is restricted to Σ [t,T ] ) be an ǫ-optimal solution, for a fixed ǫ > 0, to the the problem on the right-hand side of (46).That is, 
If we combine the inequalities from (49) and (51), then we have
Note that, since ǫ is arbitrary, we obtain (46). This completes the proof of Proposition 3. ✷ Then, we have the following results (i.e., Propositions 4 and 5) that characterize the measurable mapping F in (18) .
Proposition 4 Suppose that the generator functional g satisfies Assumption 1. Let
is the viscosity solution of (40) with boundary condition Ψ f (T, x) for x ∈ R d and with w = (û, v).
e., a local maximum at (t 0 , x 0 )). Further, for a small δt > 0, we consider a constant control v s = α for s ∈ [t 0 , t 0 + δt]. Then, from (46), we have
, α ds + ϕ(t 0 + δt, X t 0 ,x 0 ;w t 0 +δt ) , with w = (û, α).
(53)
Using the translation property of ρ
, we obtain the following inequality
, then, using the Itô formula, we can evaluate the difference between ϕ(t 0 + δt, X t 0 ,x 0 ;w t 0 +δt ) and ϕ(t 0 , x 0 ) as follow
Moreover, if we substitute the above equation into (54), then we obtain
which amounts to solving the following BSDẼ
From Lemma 2, the above BSDE admits unique solutions, i.e.,
Note that the mapping
is continuous and, since V is compact, then s → X t 0 ,x 0 ;w s is also continuous. As a result, the expression under the integral in (61) is continuous. Further, if we divide both sides of (61) by δt and letting δt → 0, then we obtain the following
Notice that, since ǫ is arbitrary, we conclude that V v f (·, ·) is a viscosity supersolution of (45), with boundary condition ϕ(T, x) = Ψ f (T, x). This completes the proof of Proposition 4. ✷
Remark 6 Note that if
, then such a solution also satisfies (45) with boundary condition V v f (T, x) = Ψ f (T, x). Furthermore, using the verification theorem, one can also identify V v f as the optimal value function. 
Proposition 5 Suppose that Proposition 4 holds and let
ϕ ∈ C 1,2 b ([0, T ] × R d ) satisfy (40) with ϕ T, x = Ψ f (T, x) for x ∈ R d . Then, ϕ t, x ≤ V v f t, x for any control v · ∈ V [t,
T ] with restriction to Σ [t,T ] and for all
consider a process κ s, X t,x;w s , with w = (û, v), for s ∈ [t, T ]. Then, using Itô integral formula, we can evaluate the difference between κ T, X t,x;w T and κ t, x as follow
Using (40), we further obtain the following ) is a solution to BSDE in (21) . As a result of this, we have
Moreover, if there exists at least onev satisfying (63). Then, for v =v, the inequality in (66) becomes an equality (i.e., κ(t, x) = Vv f t, x ). Note that the corresponding pathwise solution X t,x;ŵ s , withŵ = (û,v) andv = F (û), is progressively measurable, sincê v · ∈ V [t,T ] is restricted to Σ [t,T ] . This completes the proof of Proposition 5. ✷
On the stochastic controllability
As we have already mentioned in the previous sections (i.e., Section 2 and Subsection 3.1), for a given leader's risk-averse decisionû · ∈ U [t,T ] , the risk-averse optimization in (22) (or equation (21)) admits a unique solutionv · = F (û · ), which is restricted to Σ [t,T ] . However, the situation is more involved for the risk-averse optimization in (23) (or equation (20)). Notice that it is not even clear that, for every ξ T arget ∈ L 2 (Ω, F T , P; R), there exist decision processes u · ∈ U [t,T ] and A t,x;w · ∈ S 2 t, T ; R , with 
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Moreover, verifying the above conditions amounted to solving the stochastic controllability type problem, which is indeed useful to describe the set of all acceptable risk-exposures,
In the following subsection, we provide additional results that provide conditions under which the problem in (27) makes sense, if the follower is involved not only in minimizing his own accumulated risk-cost (in response to the decision of the leader) but also in minimizing that of the leader.
On the risk-averse optimality condition for the leader
In this subsection, we provide conditions under which the leader chooses its optimality risk-averse decision, whenever the follower responds optimally to the leader's decision, i.e., v = F (u), with restriction to Σ [0,T ] . Therefore, we suppose here that Proposition 5 holds and, further, we will establish a two-way connection between the reflected-BSDE in (20) and a probabilistic representation for the solution of related parabolic obstacle PDE problem.
Notice that, for each t ∈ [0, T ], the natural filtration of the Brownian motion {B s − B t , t ≤ s ≤ T }, augmented by the P-null sets of F , is denoted by {F
, there exists a unique triple Ŷ t,x;w ,Ẑ t,x;w , A t,x;w of F t s progressively measurable processes, which solves the following reflected-BSDE. More precisely, we consider the following related parabolic obstacle PDE problem. Then, roughly speaking, its solution is a function ϕ :
Hence, we consider such a solution for (71) in the sense of viscosity. For the sake of convenience, we also provide the definition of viscosity solutions for the above parabolic obstacle PDE problem (cf. Definition 3).
In other words, at any point (t, x), where ϕ(t, x) > h(t, x)
is said to be a viscosity solution of (71) if is both a viscosity suband supersolution. 
Lemma 4 For
Indeed, this will show that
is mean-square continuous, and so is
ButŶ t,x;w t is deterministic, since it is F t t -measurable.
Furthermore, note that (73) is a consequence of Proposition 9 (see the Appendix section) and the following convergences as n → ∞: Next, we show that ϕ is a subsolution of (71). Let (t, x) be a point at which ϕ(t, x) > h(t, x), and let From Lemma 6.1 in [5] , there exists sequences
From the assumption that ϕ(t, x) > h(t, x) and the uniform convergence of ϕ n , it follows that for j large enough ϕ n j (t j , x j ) > h(t j , x j ); hence taking the limit as n j → +∞ in the above inequality yields
and we have proved that ϕ is a subsolution of (71).
Then, we conclude the proof by showing that ϕ is a supersolution of (71). Let (t, x) be an arbitrary point in [0, T ] × R d and . We already know that ϕ(t, x) ≥ h(t, x). By the same argument as above, there exist sequences: − g l (t j , x j , ϕ n j (t j , x j ), D x ψ j (t j , x j ) · σ(t j , x j , (u, F (u))))
− n j ϕ n j (t j , x j ) − h(t j , x j ) − ≥ 0.
Hence, we have
− g l (t j , x j , ϕ n j (t j , x j ), D x ψ j (t j , x j ) · σ(t j , x j , (u, F (u)))) and taking the limit as n j → +∞, then we conclude that
− g l (t, x, ϕ(t, x), D x ψ(t, x) · σ(t, x, (u, F (u)))) ≥ 0.
This completes the proof of Proposition 6. ✷
We conclude this subsection with the following proposition, which provides a condition for the leader to have an optimal risk-averse decision. (14), (21) and the reflected-BSDE in (20) on Ω, F , P, F t for every initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×R d .
Proposition 7

Further remarks
In this section, we further comment on the implication of our result in assessing the influence of the leader's decisions on the risk-averseness of the follower in relation to the direction of leader-follower information flow. F (u s )) )) , that is implicitly conditioned by the leader's decision u and that of the follower's decision v = F (u). As a result of this, the follower is involved not only in minimizing his own accumulated risk-cost (in response to the risk-averse decsion of the leader) but also in minimizing that of the leader's accumulated risk-cost. Hence, such an inherent interaction, due to the nature of the problem, constitutes a constrained information flow between the leader and that of the follower, in which the follower is required to respond optimally, in the sense of best-response correspondence to the risk-averse decision of the leader.
